まゆの部屋

POLITICAL PULSE / Softly, softly wrong approach to North Korea



Yoshio Okubo

Japan, I am afraid, has failed to take North Korea's nuclear ambition seriously enough.

I say this because, recently, one news story after another indicates Pyongyang's nuclear program is moving ahead very quickly.

On Feb. 10, North Korea announced it possessed nuclear weapons and declared an indefinite suspension of six-way talks with Japan, China, Russia, South Korea and the United States.

On April 18, South Korea confirmed that operation of a graphite-moderated reactor at North Korea's Yongbyong nuclear complex had been shut down. North Korea was believed to have shut down the complex to harvest spent plutonium fuel rods that could be used to build nuclear weapons.

In an interview with a U.S. newspaper, North Korea's deputy ambassador to the United Nations confirmed his government's plan to produce nuclear bombs.

On April 22, a high-ranking U.S. official was quoted in a U.S. newspaper as saying North Korea could be preparing to test a nuclear weapon.

Then in a press conference last Thursday, U.S. President George W. Bush expressed grave concern about North Korea's ability to deliver nuclear weapons. He said there was a danger North Korea had obtained the technology to produce nuclear weapons compact enough to be loaded on missiles.

The Japanese government so far has not overreacted to these reports. But it better not underestimate them, either.

Many observers believe actions or remarks by North Korea on its nuclear program are typical of its traditional brinkmanship diplomacy, a tactic of raising tensions and then winning concessions.

But looking back over the past few years, I just cannot agree with those who dismiss North Korean moves as simply tactical diplomacy.

In December 2002, North Korea declared it had scrapped a 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States and lifted its self-imposed suspension of nuclear development.

The dominant view back then was that North Korea was most unlikely to undertake a nuclear program that would isolate it from the international community and invite sanctions.

But in January 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and restarted its nuclear reactors.

In April that year, Pyongyang hinted it had begun reprocessing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods that had been monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency and, in October that year, it announced the reprocessing had been completed.

Last September, its vice foreign minister said North Korea had "weaponized" nuclear materials. A declaration that it possessed nuclear weapons was made in February.

North Korea attended three rounds of the six-way talks between August 2003 and June. In the early days of the talks, there was optimism that North Korea would be forced to abandon its nuclear program, just as Libya did, in the face of the U.S. military capability demonstrated in the Iraqi war.

But such a view has been proven wrong by a series of actions taken by North Korea.

Pyongyang, in other words, has said one thing but done another, proof that, even when it appeared to be pursuing a dialogue with the United States, it never gave up developing nuclear weapons.

For Japan, the nuclear armament of a neighboring country is unacceptable and a very serious threat. Why then is the Japanese government not reacting strongly?

There are several reasons, according to diplomats.

First, Japan does not usually have the means to verify statements about nuclear development made by North Korean officials. The same goes for intelligence or media reports from the United States or South Korea.

And even when information can be verified, there are very few countermeasures Japan can take alone. That is why the government would rather act in coordination with the United States or China, according to the diplomats.

Second, Japan and North Korea, at a September 2002 summit meeting, adopted the Pyongyang Declaration, in which both sides agreed to abide by all international agreements relevant to nuclear development.

The Japanese government regards the declaration as still valid. By doing so, it is actually turning a blind eye to North Korea's violation of one or two international agreements. But remaining a party to the declaration gives Japan some leverage to negotiate to Pyongyang.

Third, throughout April, the Foreign Ministry was overwhelmed in dealing with massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in China and was unable to keep up with developments in North Korea.

But despite this, it is still unacceptable for North Korea to become a nuclear power.

In the meantime, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced during a recent visit to Pakistan that Japan would lift the suspension of official development assistance to that country. The ban, ironically, was instituted in 1998 in protest over Pakistan's nuclear testing. I wonder what kind of reaction North Korea would have to Japan's inconsistency on the nuclear issue as demonstrated by resuming ODA to Pakistan.

The situation could worsen unless Japan adopts a firm position toward North Korea. The Japanese government, I am afraid, is sending the wrong message with its softly, softly approach.

Okubo is political news editor of The Yomiuri Shimbun.